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Abstract—Fabless semiconductor industries are facing the rise 
of design costs of integrated circuits. This rise is link to the 
technology change and the complexity increasing. It follows that 
integrated circuits have become targets of counterfeiting and 
theft. The SALWARE project aims to study (theoretically and 
experimentally) salutary hardware design in order to fight 
against theft, illegal cloning and counterfeiting of integrated 
circuits. Salutary hardware means an embedded hardware 
system, hardly detectable / circumvented, inserted in an 
integrated circuit or a virtual component (Intellectual Property), 
used to provide intellectual property information (eg 
watermarking or hardware license) and / or to remotely activate 
the circuit or IP after manufacture and during use. 
Index Terms—salutary hardware, IP protection, IC 
counterfeiting, IP watermarking. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The microelectronics industry is facing increased costs of 
production of integrated circuits. This increase is due to the 
decrease in technology and the increasing complexity of 
systems (e.g. the transition from 32nm to 28nm technology is 
accompanied by a 40% increase in manufacturing costs with 
300 mm wafers in diameter and a 30% increase in 
manufacturing costs with 450 mm wafers). For several years, 
this has led to a sharp increase in the number of companies 
with no means of production (fabless companies) and the 
relocation of production. In addition, integrated circuits 
manufactured today are produced with high added value in a 
highly competitive industry. Moreover, their time-to-market is 
increasingly tight. This makes them the targets of 
counterfeiting and theft. 
In recent years, the issue of counterfeiting of integrated 
circuits has increased considerably. For example, the number 
of counterfeit electronic circuits collected by U.S. Customs 
from 2001 to 2011 has increased by around 700 [1]. Between 
2007 and 2010, U.S. Customs collected 5.6 million counterfeit 
electronic products [2]. Overall, the estimation of 
counterfeiting is about 7% of the semiconductor market [3] 
which represents a loss of about $ 10 billion per year for the 
legal industry. It is therefore crucial and strategic to implement 
research projects to protect the intellectual property of IC 
designers. 
To summarize the threat model of IC during manufacturing 
and life, Fig. 1 shows a simplified life cycle of an IC from a 
fabless designer to recycling. This cycle includes many threats 
to intellectual property from the designer: netlist theft, IP theft, 
mask theft, chip over-production (overbuilding), untested 
device theft, discarded device, reverse engineering, device 
counterfeiting, cloning, relabeled-repackaged-falsified “like 
new device”. 
We propose to fight against theft, illegal cloning and 
counterfeiting of integrated circuit by designing salutary 
hardware (salware). Salware is from the opposite of malware 
(malicious hardware) but can use the same technique, strategy 
and means.  Salware means an embedded hardware system, 
hardly detectable, hardly circumvented, inserted in an 
integrated circuit or an IP, used to provide intellectual property 
information and/or to remotely activate the circuit or IP after 
manufacture and during use. IP Watermarking, PUF for IC 
authentication, remote activation, logic encryption, FSM 
encryption, memory encryption, bus encryption, hardware 
metering, VHDL obfuscation, bitstream encryption (FPGA), 
are some on the well-know salwares. In this short paper, we 
don’t want to give a state of the art of these usual salwares. We 
want to discuss a new strategy to design salware by studying 
malware. Following section present some ideas that we want to 
investigate in order to find new efficient salwares. 
 
Fig. 1 - simplified life cycle of an IC from a fabless designer to recycling with threat model 
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II. NEW STRATEGIES FOR SALWARE DESIGN 
In the area of security, a means of attack can also be a 
means of protection. The techniques used to attack and to 
defend have always been very close. Investigating ways of 
attacks and malicious hardware is the strategy that we propose 
to develop new efficient salware. At a first glance, three 
options can be considered: hardware trojans, backdoors and 
side channels. Other means of attack / malware can be also 
investigated. 
A. Hardware Trojan Spirit 
Small, hardly detectable, hardware Trojans are able to 
disable a part of a device or to allow information leakage 
without degradation of the system performance. According to 
our proposed definition, such characteristics are required to 
design efficient salware. Embedding a Trojan inside an IP in 
order to protect it during evaluation was recently proposed [4]. 
This work proposes to modify the IP finite state machine in 
order to disturb the normal functional behavior of the IP. With 
such salware it is possible to putt an “expiry date” on the FSM 
control and to sell evaluation IP (temporary license). It is a 
time-based activation mechanism of Trojan [5], [6]. Others 
activation mechanism can be used to disturb the IP in case of 
illegal use such as expired hardware license or illegal copy. For 
example, a salware based on Trojan principles can use a PUF 
response to disturb or not an IP. Such physical-condition-based 
activation can permit to link an IP to a hardware 
implementation (hardware license). 
As we have previously said, hardware Trojan can be 
designed to change the functionality of the infected device but 
also to silently leak information. Designing salware with a 
Trojan spirit could be a new opportunity to design IP 
watermarking. Watermarking techniques to fight against illegal 
IP copy and to allow IP traceability are already well-study. 
Recent study has shown that inserting watermarking during 
synthesis of IP netlist allows obtaining best results [7]. 
Embedding Trojan during the synthesis process is also an 
efficient way to design powerful and optimized Trojans. To 
conclude watermarking techniques could be efficiently 
improve by using Trojan mechanism to silently leak 
intellectual property information (mark).  
Last but not least, hardware Trojan can be inserted in all 
location on the device: processor, hardware accelerator, 
memory, bus, i/o, NoC, power supply, analog part. That is 
really interesting to extend current works on salware which are 
often limited to logical gate, FSM, data-path and bus.  
B. Official Backdoors 
A recent work claimed that a backdoor was inserted into an 
FPGA [8]. This paper whipped up a storm on web before 
publication. Incriminated firm claimed that the inserted 
hardware was not malicious but salutary! This short story 
shown that malicious and salutary hardware are really close. 
Sometimes it is hard to distinguish them. Designers have to 
keep in mind that embedded salutary hardware could be 
misconstrued. 
C. Side Channel Emission 
The side channel attacks are well-known attacks in the field 
of cryptographic engineering. Most of the dynamic 
characteristics of both hardware and software implementation 
of cipher can be used for side channel analysis: the 
computation time, power consumption, electromagnetic 
radiation, optical radiation and even the produced sound during 
computation. The above descriptions are mainly oriented for 
side channel analysis. Such attack techniques can be used to 
read intellectual property information from the device to the 
verification process (watermarking checking). 
Some published works proposed to use side channel as a 
communication channel to extract intellectual property. 
Thermal channel was used in [9] to allow a communication 
from an embedded tag to a remote receiver. Power 
consumption was used in [10]. Other side channel information 
can be efficiently used to transmit information about the IP. 
From example, like thermal channel, electromagnetic channel 
allows contactless checking. To conclude, side channels have 
to be used to design salware with discreet communication 
means. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Investigating malicious hardware design and behavior is an 
opportunity to improve salutary hardware. Salware project 
aims at to design efficient intellectual property protection by 
follow this strategy. We hope to find new ways of protection, 
more efficient, more useful, more secure and low cost than 
state of the art  existing protections. 
REFERENCES 
[1] C. Gorman. Counterfeit Chips on the Rise. IEEE Spectrum, June 
2012. 
[2] AGMA, Alliance for Gray Markets and Counterfeit Adatement, 
http://www.agmaglobal.org 
[3] M. Pecht, S. Tiku. Bogus! Electronic manufacturing and 
consumers confront a rising tide of counterfeit electronics. IEEE 
Spectrum, May 2006. 
[4] Narasimhan, S.; Bhunia, S.; Chakraborty, R.S., "Hardware IP 
Protection During Evaluation Using Embedded Sequential 
Trojan," Design & Test of Computers, IEEE , vol.29, no.3, 
pp.70,79, June 2012 
[5] Karri, R.; Rajendran, J.; Rosenfeld, K.; Tehranipoor, M., 
"Trustworthy Hardware: Identifying and Classifying Hardware 
Trojans," Computer, vol.43, no.10, pp.39,46, Oct. 2010. 
[6] Tehranipoor, M.; Koushanfar, F., "A Survey of Hardware 
Trojan Taxonomy and Detection," Design & Test of Computers, 
IEEE , vol.27, no.1, pp.10,25, Jan.-Feb. 2010 
[7] B. Legal, L. Bossuet, "Automatic low-cost IP watermarking 
technique based on output mark insertion". Journal of Design 
Automation for Embedded System, Springer, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 
71-92, June 2012. 
[8] S. Skorobogatov, C. Woods, "Breakthrough Silicon Scanning 
Discovers Backdoor in Military Chip". Cryptographic Hardware 
and Embedded Systems, CHES 2012, Springer, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science Volume 7428, pp. 23-40, 2012. 
[9] Marsh, C.; Kean, T.; Mclaren, D., "Protecting designs with a 
passive thermal tag," Electronics, Circuits and Systems, 2008. 
ICECS 2008. 15th IEEE International Conference on , vol., no., 
pp.218,221, Aug. 31 2008-Sept. 3 2008 
[10] Georg T. Becker, Markus Kasper, Amir Moradi and Christof 
Paar, "Side-channel based watermarks for integrated circuits, " 
IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security 
and Trust (HOST), 2010. 
